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was bluffing (or even if it was capable of such an act), a nuclear detonation 
took place. 
While the intelligence community now debates whether or not it was 
successful, Pyongyang is insisting that it must be recognized as a nuclear 
weapons state before it will discuss giving up its weapons. The other five 
parties must speak firmly and with one voice in disabusing Pyongyang of this 
notion. Current demonstrations of flexibility notwithstanding, Washington 
must continue to make it clear that it is impossible for any U.S. president, 
regardless of political party, to establish diplomatic relations with a nuclear 
weapons-equipped DPRK.
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Summary: The sharp rise of oil and gas prices has enabled Moscow to utilise its mammoth 
energy reserves to achieve domestic and foreign policy goals. The new Russian ‘power 
politics’ have already been tested on the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, and recently 
the Czech Republic. Russia’s Far Eastern frontier is now turning into the place where 
energy export becomes a political tool in shaping the country’s relations with regional 
neighbours. China, the two Koreas, and Japan are hungry for energy, natural resources 
and, at the same time, strive for economic and political cooperation. In such circumstances, 
the opportunities offered by trans-national railroads and pipelines appear to be more 
powerful than weapons. Given this new leverage and understanding, can Russia exert 
its soft and hard power upon North Korea in promoting the goals set in the Six-Party 
Talks?
The second phase of North Korea’s denuclearization process is completed. As part of the deal with the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of 
Korea, Russia, Japan and the United States, in June 2008 Pyongyang filed its 
nuclear activity declaration and even blew up a cooling tower of its defunct 
nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. For its part, the United States has officially 
pledged to remove the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 
the State Sponsors of Terrorism List and lifted the application of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act to this country. All five members of the Six-Party Talks are now 
expected to deliver to North Korea almost a million tons of heavy fuel oil to 
compensate for the lost energy production. 
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The general expectation is that these actions will solve the North Korean 
nuclear dilemma by providing North Korea with the energy it is going to miss 
out on. Nevertheless, the third stage of North Korea’s denuclearization does 
not seem to be showing a smooth start. The DPRK Foreign Ministry complains 
that it has disabled 80% of its main nuclear complex but has received only 40% 
of the promised energy shipments. Pyongyang now threatens that it will only 
move on to the next phase of the denuclearization process – to abandon and 
dismantle its nuclear weapons programs – only when it has been awarded all 
the energy aid and political benefits promised under the deal.1 
The nervousness of Pyongyang, which has been championing the motto 
of ‘a strong and prosperous nation’, is understandable. The January 2008 Joint 
Editorial promised that the government would 
focus on the economy. Nevertheless, the 
skyrocketing international prices on fuel and 
grain have already caused an unprecedented 
hike in the food prices in North Korea. The crop 
of the previous year was largely destroyed by 
the disastrous hurricane that in combination 
with the deportation of international aid 
agencies has created the danger of another 
famine. The new conservative administration 
in Seoul, which from the outset took a 
hardline on inter-Korean agreements, has 
further complicated the picture. Despite the 
apparent progress on the international stage, 
the North Korean leadership is now likely to 
face a serious domestic problem.
In the mid-1990s, despite the universal 
predictions of imminent collapse, the DPRK 
managed to survive. Even the landslide of 
the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998) did not undermine the foundations 
of its centrally-planned economy. The country endured the ‘Arduous March’ 
(better known abroad as ‘Silent Famine’) which cost millions of North 
Korean lives. Their leadership assumed that one meal per day would keep the 
1 The North Korean side insists on the principle of ‘action for action’ as a basic require-
ment. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Implementation of Agreement Adopted 
by Six-Party Talks”, KCNA (July 4, 2008); http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2008/200807/
news07/05.htm#1.
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majority of the population weak but loyal, as long as the state machinery and 
military-industrial complex has the ample supply of energy. Fortunately for 
Pyongyang, the 1990s were marked by the record low oil prices that can be 
attributed to the secret of DPRK’s survival. 
Whether or not Kim Jong II will be able to rescue his nation again from the 
looming catastrophe depends on his ability to quickly find access to relatively 
cheap fuel and energy. In this connection the role of Russia as the largest 
depository of natural resources is difficult to underestimate. Russia holds one 
third of the world’s natural gas (48 trillion cu m), possesses one of the world’s 
largest oil reserves (approximately 50-100 billion barrels), and produces 
annually 1 trillion kWh of electricity. In the times of political collapse and 
economic recession these resources provided Russia with confidence and 
attracted foreign direct investment. 
Recently, the sharp rise of oil and gas prices has enabled Moscow to 
utilize its mammoth energy reserves in achieving domestic and foreign policy 
goals. The nationalization of the largest Russian oil company Yukos in 2004, 
along with the consolidation of state-owned Gazprom and RAO Unified Energy 
System in 2005, have further empowered the Kremlin in making single-
handed decisions on the directions and length of new pipelines, high-voltage 
power lines, and railways, literally forming the new geopolitical landscape in 
Northeast Asia. 
The new Russian ‘power politics’ have already been tested on the Baltic 
States, Belarus, Ukraine, and recently the Czech Republic. Russia’s Far Eastern 
frontier is also turning into the place where energy export becomes a political 
tool in shaping the country’s relations with regional neighbors. China, the two 
Koreas, and Japan are hungry for energy, natural resources and, at the same 
time, strive for economic and political cooperation. In such circumstances, 
the opportunities offered by trans-national railroads and pipelines appear to 
be more powerful than weapons. Given this new leverage and understanding, 
can Russia exert its soft and hard power upon North Korea in promoting the 
goals set in the Six-Party Talks? 
Although the shortage of food is a pressing issue, an industrialized 
nation like the DPRK would definitely benefit in the long run from access 
to affordable energy resources, which only Russia can provide. In this light, 
the nature of relations between Russia and North Korea will become a key to 
the ultimate solution of the regional security problem. However, can Russia 
help North Korea become a ‘strong and prosperous nation’ without itself 
entering into conflict with the rest of the Northeast Asian community? The 
effectiveness of Russia’s new ‘power politics’ in Northeast Asia is now being 
tested through its relations with North Korea. 
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Besieged North Korea 
No longer an ‘enemy’ or ‘sponsor of terrorism’ in the books of the US 
State Department, North Korea remains a subject to endless sanctions and 
restrictions which leave little hope for its access to international markets or 
bank credits. The recent removal of North Korea from the State Sponsors of 
Terrorism List and the termination of President Truman’s 1950 imposition 
of Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) are not really enacting any change. 
Almost simultaneously with lifting the TWEA, the White House issued an 
Executive Order declaring a ‘national emergency’ which, as stated in the 
order, necessitates the continuance of certain restrictions on North Korea 
that would otherwise be lifted.2 
Similarly, North Korea will not have restored access to the international 
banking system, from which it was largely cut off in 2005 amid the Banco 
Delta Asia money laundering and counterfeit allegations. Statements from 
the US Treasury further explain that no substantive actions with regard to 
lifting sanctions on North Korea have actually been taken. Sanctions aimed 
at ending North Korean money laundering, illicit financing activities and 
weapons proliferation will remain in effect, as well as sanctions that prohibit 
US companies from owning, leasing, operating, or insuring North Korean-
flagged shipping vessels, and from registering vessels in the DPRK. 
Another pressing issue that is being addressed by the Six-Party Talks 
partners is the acute shortage of food in North Korea. The United States 
has started the delivery of 500,000 metric tons of food, while China has 
committed another 150,000 tons. 3,000 tons of flour has already arrived from 
Russia. Generous humanitarian aid coming from elsewhere has enabled the 
Pyongyang leadership to turn down the modest offer of 50,000 tons of corn 
made by the new conservative government of South Korea. This shows that 
the food situation in the North is difficult but not catastrophic. The looming 
energy crisis is much more acute. With oil prices firmly over $140 per barrel 
and heading further up, industrialized but the impoverished DPRK economy 
is trapped. 
All imports of crude and refined oil traditionally would come from Russia 
or China at ‘friendly’ prices. With the end of Cold War confrontation and 
2 N. Finnemann, “Explosive Progress in the Six Party Talks: What’s Left To Do When It Is 
All Done?”, Korea Economic Institute (July 1, 2008); http://newsmanager.commpartners.
com/kei/issues/2008-07-01/index.html.
the development of inter-Korean dialogue, occasional oil shipments were 
offered to Pyongyang by its sworn enemies, South Korea, Japan and the 
United States. The continuing shortage of energy forced Kim Jong II to trade 
his treasured nuclear program for crude oil in 1994 as part of the Framework 
Agreement with the US. The new agreement reached through Six-Party Talks 
in Beijing on February 13, 2007 promised 1 million tons of fuel oil to North 
Korea in exchange for its nuclear programs. However, this amount will not 
be sufficient to cover the North’s needs in energy for longer than a couple of 
years. After that Pyongyang has to be prepared either to reduce the amount 
of import or to invest considerably more in fuel importation. 
Currently, most of North Korea’s oil is 
imported from China. This is the reason why 
Pyongyang’s trade deficit with this former 
communist patron is growing so quickly. 
In 2007, the DPRK imported 523,000 tons 
of crude oil from China that accounted 
approximately for 25% of its total imports, 
and North Korea’s trade deficit with China 
is steadily growing.3 How much of this oil is 
sold and how much donated is a state secret, 
but given the poor economic standing of 
North Korea it is clear that this trend cannot 
continue indefinitely without causing 
tensions in relations between Beijing and 
Pyongyang. 
The production of mineral fertilizer is 
also directly linked to the availability of 
cheap energy. During the last ten years, 
while South Korea was governed by the 
liberal administrations that pursued the friendly Sunshine Policy towards 
the North, each spring Pyongyang would receive 300-400 thousand tons of 
fertilizer for free. Generous cash and rice donations from Seoul dried up in 
early 2008, when a new conservative president, Lee Myung Bak, was elected. 
Developmental projects, inked at the Second Inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang, 
were designed to renovate the dilapidating North’s infrastructure but became 
summarily scrapped by the new government in the South. 
3 “World Oil and Grain Prices Up, DPRK Feels the Pinch”, Woodrow Wilson International 
Centre for Scholars Report; http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/mar_2.pdf.
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North Korea has little to expect from Japan. The conservative Liberal 
Democratic Party of Japan made its mission to upset any accord with the 
Pyongyang which does not lead to the immediate return of surviving or 
deceased Japanese citizens kidnapped by the overly zealous North Korean 
spies in the 1970s and 1980s. Japan’s Prime Ministers have been consistent in 
adopting the hard-line approach which included mentioning the abductees 
issue whenever possible and therefore delaying the normalization of bilateral 
relations with the DPRK. While other parties struggle to achieve a multilateral 
agreement, Japan assumes that sooner or later it will get what it wants because 
without Japanese money no successful conclusion of negotiations at the Six-
Party Talks is conceivable.4  
In other words, despite the official completion of the second phase of the 
nuclear disarmament deal on June 26, 2008, the prospects for self-reliant 
recovery for North Korea remain problematic. Although the food and energy 
issues are ostensibly being addressed, the denuclearized North Korea is going 
to be significantly weaker and vulnerable than before due to the changing 
international circumstances. The skyrocketing oil and food prices promise to 
aggravate the domestic situation in the DPRK much more effectively than any 
deliberate policy designed to achieve a regime change or economic system 
collapse in that country. To remedy this situation the North is facing the 
dilemma of either reneging on the Six-Party Talks agreements or changing its 
position on energy security. 
Russia’s Energy Policy
The most significant issue involving Russia in Northeast Asia is its abundant 
oil fields and natural gas reserves. The Asian Financial crisis of 1997-1998 
that devaluated the Russian rouble and the dramatic rise in the price of crude 
oil and natural gas in the early 2000s has given Russia newfound economic 
muscle.5 The state-controlled Gazprom is the third largest corporation in the 
world in terms of market capitalization and it will grow even stronger, as 
many experts predict, while the industry is being swiftly renationalized. 
“Russia’s economy is about oil” explains Natalia Orlova, chief economist 
4 M. Okano-Heijmans, “Games Nations Play: Politics, Diplomacy and the North Kore-
an Nuclear Crisis”, Australian National University, unpublished research paper (May 
2008).
5 P. F. Hueper, “The Energy Locomotive”, J.H. Kalicki, E.K. Lawson (eds) Russian-Eurasian 
Renaissance? U.S. Trade and Investment in Russia and Eurasia. (Washington D.C.: Woodrow 
Wilson Centre Press, 2003), p. 177.
at the Moscow-based Alfa-Bank.6 In 2006, oil and gas were estimated to 
account for 65% of Russia’s exports and 60% of federal tax receipts, making 
it the world’s largest gas exporter and second-largest oil exporter after Saudi 
Arabia. In 2007, Russia’s foreign exchange reserves swelled to $476.4 billion, 
more than in the entire Euro zone.7
Russia’s energy holding provide Moscow with powerful leverage on 
the international stage, a status not seen since the end of the Cold War. 
Expectations about East Siberian energy reserves have risen especially 
after April 2006, when Russia started building the $12.5 billion Taishet-
Skovorodino-Kozmino oil pipeline. A series of disputes over what route the 
pipeline would take preceded the final decision.8 Initially, China’s Daqing 
was considered as the destination for a shorter and cheaper private-owned 
pipeline. This plan was lobbied by the then powerful Yukos CEO, Mikhail 
Khordokovsky. Nevertheless, the Kremlin and state bureaucracy promptly 
interfered, sending the beleaguered oligarch to jail and reconfiguring the 
whole deal in favor of running the pipe to the Pacific coast of the Russian 
Maritime Province. 
Russia’s primary goal is to develop its sparsely populated Far Eastern 
region, which consists of nine territories that are extremely heterogeneous in 
political, social and economic terms. Each of the nine Far Eastern members of 
the Russian Federation essentially has its own political system, its own business 
elites, and enjoys a certain degree of autonomy, making the coordination of 
common goals for the region very difficult.9 Thus, development projects that 
would bring benefits to the greatest number of such provinces are currently 
in Moscow’s interest. Still it was primarily the international policy factor that 
played a major role in influencing the final decision to end the oil pipe on the 
Russian coast of the Pacific Ocean.
In a sideline meeting at the 2005 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum in Busan, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin met with then Japanese 
6 “Russians Mask Economy’s Weakness with Shopping, Building Frenzy”, Bloomberg (No-
vember 30, 2006).
7 “Russia”, CIA – The World Fact Book; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rs.html.
8 N. Simonia, “Russian East Siberia and the Far East: A Basis for Co-operation with North-
east Asia”, Global Asia (September 2006); F.W. Engdahl, “The Emerging Russian Giant: 
the U.S. Eurasia and Global Geopolitics”, Japan Focus (October 26, 2006).
9 A. Lukin, “Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Asia and Prospects for Regional Com-
munity”, conference “New Approaches to Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia”, Mos-
cow (May 26-28, 2005).
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Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and officially offered the Eastern Sea (Sea 
of Japan) as the destination for the pipeline in question. Koizumi reportedly 
reciprocated by saying that Japan would back Russia’s bid to join the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).10 In order to keep China happy, it was also decided 
that the branch pipeline would extend from Skovorodino to Daqing. Although 
the pipeline‘s first stage (Taishet-Skovorodino) was due to be completed in 2008, 
a corruption scandal and environmental concerns postponed the estimated 
date of completion to 2009.11 Construction of the 2,100 km-long second stage 
from Skovorodino to the Pacific Ocean would start after the launch of the first 
stage and, therefore, cannot be commissioned before 2015 or even 2017. In the 
meantime, extracted oil will be delivered to consumers by railway. 
Russia’s natural resources have already become a crucial factor for regional 
economic development. Along with the opening access to Siberian oil, China 
and Japan are vying for Russian natural gas 
reserves. Indeed, the mood at a September 
2006 multinational energy conference in 
Seoul – Toward Regional Energy Cooperation in 
Northeast Asia: Key Issues in the Development 
of Oil and Gas in Russia – would testify to 
this.12 Answering a multitude of questions 
from Chinese, Japanese, and South Koreans 
regarding where exactly its gas would be 
going in East Asia, Gazprom Counselor Alexey Mastepanov did not stop 
repeating – “Gas must be produced only after it is sold”. The problem, 
however, remains in negotiating the suitable price which until now stops the 
construction of the new gas pipeline from Russia and opens opportunities for 
competitors in Central Asia.13 
Such a pragmatic approach to energy cooperation with neighbors also 
suggests that any cooperation between Russia and North Korea will also 
be based on a purely economic level. The Deputy Director of the Russian 
10  “The Case Against Summits”, The Economist (November 24, 2005).
11 “Транснефть: На ВСТО процветает коррупция”, Росбалт (July 14, 2008); http://
www.rosbalt.ru/2008/7/14/499772.html.
12 “Toward Regional Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Key Issues in the Development 
of Oil and Gas in Russia”, Korea Energy Economics Institute 2006 International Sympo-
sium; http://www.ecoin.or.kr/zeroboard/view.php?id=eidb&sitelink2=24&no=1295.
13 On July 9, 2008 Kazakhstan joined the construction of a pan-Central Asia pipeline, a 
major project to link the Caspian Sea gas reserves with China. “Kazakhstan Building 
Gas Pipeline to China”, China.Org.Cn (July 10, 2008); http://www.china.org.cn/environ-
ment/news/2008-07/10/content_15988108.htm.
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Ministry of Industry and Energy, Igor Scheulov, confirmed that Russia 
maintains regular contact with the DPRK concerning energy cooperation 
at both the corporate and government levels. A large pipeline project was 
supposed to send natural gas from Kovyktinskoye field in Irkutsk province 
through China to South Korea. One of the routes under consideration would 
have gone through North Korea and it was envisaged that Pyongyang would 
receive free natural gas as a pipeline transit fee.14 
Nevertheless, despite enthusiasm for the idea, it seemed fairly clear that 
running a pipeline through impoverished and rapidly nuclearising North 
Korea was a risky business. Due to both cost and security concerns the DPRK 
was left out in the results of a November 2003 preliminary feasibility study 
conducted by Chinese, Russian and South Korean companies. A tentative 
agreement was reached on a pipeline route that would go from Irkutsk 
through China to the port of Dalian and under the Yellow Sea to South Korean 
Pyongtaek. North Korea would be bypassed out of fear that Pyongyang might 
have too much control over the supply of gas to the South.15 
When the consolidating Gazprom Corporation took control over this 
project in 2005, it suddenly started changing the conditions of the proposed 
deal. Reserving the gas from Kovykta for domestic use, the Russian side 
offered China and South Korea the natural gas from the still underdeveloped 
Chayandinskoye field in Sakha. In that case the pipe route would pass 
through Khabarovsk and Nakhodka, approaching the Korean Peninsula 
from the east. Upon learning this news the South Korean Kogas corporation 
refused to sign the deal as it would have been much costlier and, ultimately, 
devoid of economic sense. The poor level of customer service by the state-
owned Gazprom and the low demand for the liquefied natural gas in South 
Korea (only 13% of all energy consumption) were attributed to the failure of 
this project.16
The prospects for the export of Russian electrical power to the countries of 
Northeast Asia, as well, depend as much on political will and stability in the 
region as on the state of North Korea’s power grid infrastructure. At present 
14 Three prospective projects involving North Korea have been discussed so far: one that 
would bring natural gas from Irkutsk province, another from the northern Republic of 
Sakha, and a third from the island of Sakhalin. 
15 P. Falkenheim Meyer, “Russo-North Korean Relations Under Kim Jong-il”, M.E. Sharpe, 
H.N. Kim, Y.H. Kihl (eds) North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. (New York: An East 
Gate Book, 2006), p. 209.
16 Д. Верхотуров, “Энергетическая политика России на Корейском полуострове”, АПН-
Казахстан (April-May 2006); http://vestnik.tripod.com/articles/korea-russia-gas.html.
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the Far-Eastern division of the Russian government-controlled RAO Unified 
Energy System is considering several different projects, which are aimed at 
helping North and South Korea to satisfy their energy needs. According to 
one plan, Russia will direct electricity from Bureyskaya Hydropower Plant 
via the DPRK to the Republic of Korea (ROK). The high-voltage (500 kilovolt) 
electrical power transmission lines can be fixed very high above the ground 
to make any illegal tapping into or interruption of electricity by the North 
unlikely. Neither will South Korea be able to exert any pressure upon the 
DPRK: power allocated for the North will go along a separate line because 
the electrical grids in the two Koreas are 
technologically different. Another plan 
suggests that Russia will be able to provide 
800 MW of electric power to North Korea 
in substitution of the energy promised by 
South Korea to that country. 
Earlier projects which would have 
connected the Russian energy network 
with the two Koreas failed because South 
Korea did not want to be in a position 
of dependency on oil or gas being piped 
through the North.17 Tense international 
atmosphere surrounding North Korea’s 
nuclear ambition, continues to badly affect 
the prospects of successful implementation of Russian energy in Northeast 
Asia. Certainly, a trilateral agreement would be needed to realize this. In the 
meantime, RAO Unified Energy System is exploring the more stable markets of 
north-eastern China and Japan. 
Russia – North Korea Cooperation 
Since the early 2000s, overall relations between Russia and DPRK have 
been improving. DPRK’s importation of refined oil from Russia saw the first 
increase in 2002-2003 (from $20 million to $96 million USD) and was caused 
by the beginning of US-DPRK nuclear confrontation and the subsequent 
demise of international KEDO project. During 2004-2005, petroleum trade 
between Russia and North Korea grew from $105 million to $172.3 million. 
Until the Six-Party Talks produced first results, in the list of Russia’s exports to 
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17 “Russia and Inter-Korean Relations”, The Gorbachev Foundation (April 17, 2003).
the DPRK, oil products dominated with a strong 63%. The rampant corruption 
in both countries also let a trickle of Russian oil to be smuggled to North 
Korea unaccounted for18 
In 2006, Russia was DPRK’s third largest trading partner after China and 
South Korea and absorbed 9 percent of the total $3.18 billion dollars spent 
by the North on imports (approx. $286 million). The Kremlin’s approval of 
international sanctions against the former communist ally was accompanied 
by the curtailment of trade with the North. At the time of North Korea’s 
nuclear test in October 2006, Russia’s trade statistics showed that the exports 
of petroleum had dropped 91.1 percent compared to the same period of the 
previous year. 
The pragmatic mood in bilateral relations prevails, and these days Russia 
delivers oil and food to North Korea only in accordance with its obligations 
associated with the progress at the Six-Party Talks. This year, Russia has 
already delivered 100,000 tons of fuel oil to the DPRK in two batches and, 
according to the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, a 
top Russian envoy to the Six-Party Talks, will deliver another 100,000 tons 
by October 2008.19 In June 2008, the Russian government announced that 
it would provide 2,860 tons of flour to the DPRK. According to the official 
KCNA news agency report, this food aid arrived at the border city of Sinuiju 
in the DPRK‘s Northern Pyongan Province in early July 2008.20  
Recently, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, North Korea saw 
a major Russian investment. In the city of Pyeongseong the Russian auto 
plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line, specializing in the production 
of medium-size trucks named Taebaeksan-96. Although less than 50 trucks 
were assembled in 2007 this cooperation became an important milestone 
in the development of bilateral relations. While the project doesn’t violate 
United Nations sanctions on North Korea, it shows Moscow’s drive to expand 
its influence in the country. Ironically, the more trucks are assembled the 
heavier is North Korea’s dependence on imported fuel, engine oils and other 
petrochemical products. 
The importance of DPRK’s Rajin-Seonbong Special Economic Zone to Russia’s 
national interests is continuing to grow. The state-run monopoly OAO Russian 
18 “N.Korea’s Businesses Thriving in Russia”, Dong-A Ilbo (April 4, 2008); http://english.
donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=060000&biid=2008040448638.
19 “Russia to Send More Fuel Oil to N.K. by October: Report“, Yonhap News Agency (July 8, 
2008).
20 “Russian Food Aid Arrives in DPRK“, Xinhua (July 8, 2008).
38 Leonid Petrov Russia’s Power Politics and North Korea 39
Railways is currently upgrading its railway connections with North Korea in 
Khasan-Tumangang, investing at least 1.75 billion roubles ($72 million) into 
this project, and plans to participate in an ambitious plan to rebuild a trans-
Korean railway. By connecting Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its 
Trans-Siberian Railroad, Russia is hoping to benefit form the transit of South 
Korean and Japanese cargo which can be sent via its territory to Central Asian 
and European markets. Pyongyang seems to endorse these plans and other 
Russian initiatives but does not commit any financial resources.21 
80% of the overall bilateral economic trade between Russia and North 
Korea consists of cooperation, barter and investment-in-kind between the 
regional areas. The most active Russian regions trading with the DPRK are 
Eastern Siberia and the Far East. The Maritime Province (Primorsky Krai) itself 
exports to North Korea more than $4 million 
worth of refined oil per year. There are no oil 
fields in the Russian Maritime Province and 
the oil has to be borrowed through the chain 
of federal bureaucratic structures from the 
oil-rich areas of Eastern Siberia. Instead 
of money, the local governments agree to 
receive the labor of North Korean workers. 
North Korean laborers in Siberia and 
the Far East were common under the Soviet 
system and they are still visibly present. In 
2004, the Russian Federal Immigration Service 
issued 14,000 visas for foreign laborers, of whom North Korean laborers in 
Russia numbered 3,320 in 2005 and 5,000 in 2006. Since the DPRK has no 
other way to pay in goods or services its government accurately pays for oil 
imported from Russia by dispatching thousands of laborers at zero cost. 
Following the strong demand from local companies, just in 2006 regional 
authorities of Primorsky Krai agreed to issue extra 5,000 working visas to 
North Koreans.22 This openness is contrary to local government policy that 
normally restricts the entry of labor from China.
DPRK citizens sent to Russia work as woodcutters and builders but some 
have also managed to find work in the agricultural and marine industries. 
21 “Russian Merchants Greatly Increasing in Pyongyang”, Daily NK (April 5, 2007);
 http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=1871/.
22 “Pyongyang Offers Slaves in Exchange for Russian Oil”; http://www.asianews.it/view.
php?l=en&art=7651.
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Through the presence of these laborers, Russia has enjoyed a partial repayment 
of DPRK’s post-Soviet debt through North Korean workers being contracted 
to work in mines and lumber mills in Russia’s Far East.23 The wages they are 
able to make in Russia are far greater than what they would make at home. 
However, the foreign worker quota is set not by provincial governments but by 
Moscow that often tries to put a stop to these programs due to the complexity 
of the matter, including the refugee issue. Part of this opposition stems from 
the fact that the North Korean workers in Russia still fall under DPRK laws 
and, therefore, are subjects to intrusive supervision.
Among the most difficult but negotiable issues in the way of Russia-
North Korea cooperation remains the problem of external debt. During the 
Soviet era the DPRK incurred the debt of approximately $8 billion dollars, 
which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot repay. This debt remains 
a stumbling block in most negotiations on the new aid and development 
programs. However, this debt can potentially make the trilateral Russian-
Korean relations closer and stronger. 
Back in January 1991, soon after the opening of diplomatic relations with 
Republic of Korea, Moscow received $3 billion dollars from Seoul in the form 
of a three-year loan. The collapse of the Soviet Union left this loan largely 
unpaid. The new Russian government in the 1990s provided South Korea 
with armaments worth $150 million dollars to be counted as payment-in-kind 
for the remaining debt. In 2003, after bilateral negotiations on this issue were 
completed, part of this Russian debt was cancelled and the remainder was 
rescheduled to be paid over the next 23 years. 
Taking into account its own debts to the South, Russia could easily write off 
a significant portion of North Korean debt. To resolve this question a certain 
agreement between all three parties is needed. To engage in a mutual and 
reciprocal round of debt cancellation, Russia might choose to see the North 
and the South as one country. Such an agreement would have unblocked 
the road for a broader cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas, and 
simplified Russia’s energy cooperation with China and Japan.
Conclusions
In the 1990s, DPRK leadership must have hoped that Russia’s assistance 
would help them restore their economy in the same fashion as it used to be 
in the times of Soviet Union. However, the new market economy in Russia 
23 “Building Ties with North Korea”, The New York Times (December 11, 2003).
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provides little room for Soviet-type sponsorship, leaving North Korea in the 
sate of energy and transportation crisis.24 Disinterest among the Russian 
private sector in cooperation with North Korean companies has compounded 
this difficult situation. 
Available statistics reflecting bilateral trade in the 2000s still show the 
sluggishness of Russo-North Korean economic links. Barter and trade-in-kind 
continue to play an important role in bilateral trade, while the possibility of 
workforce export remains vital for DPRK. The current system of exchange 
between North Korea and Russia is that the former exporting labor and 
agricultural goods and the latter exporting electrical energy, oil, and raw 
materials.
As it was in the last century, railway remains a symbol of Russia’s power in 
the region. By extending its transportation network and pipeline infrastructure, 
Russia is trying to get back into the grand 
game in Northeast Asia, which it was forced 
to leave with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The only difference between then and now 
is that the main motivating factor these days 
is profit-making and economic reasoning, 
not ideological consideration. 
For communist North Korea, whose 
reclusive leadership is bogged in cold-
war mentality, this is a novel concept. 
This disparity in attitudes often creates 
misunderstanding and results in missed 
opportunities. Even the railway, which is 
Russia’s most feasible infrastructure project 
in North Korea, may be endangered by the 
unpredictability of current leadership in Pyongyang. The risks are too high to 
start any other major capital investment without a serious change in regime’s 
attitude.
Indeed, the position of reformed North Korea in the newly emerging map 
of economic interests can be surprisingly strong. The DPRK is located at the 
very centre of the world’s most vibrant and dynamically developing region. 
By playing his cards shrewdly, Kim Jong II might create conditions for socio-
24 G. Bulychev, “Korean Security Dilemmas: A Russian Perspective”, H. Smith (ed) Re-
constituting Korean Security: a Policy Primer. (United Nations University Press, 2007), 
p. 195.
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economic revitalization of the North that will be a positive contribution to the 
eventual unification of the Korean peninsula.
Moscow is learning its lesson too. Russian strategists already realize that 
North Korea might play the important role of regional balancer if it managed 
to reconcile with its ideological enemies and rivals. The contiguous powers 
would probably agree with this as long as the balancer is genuinely neutral 
and independent. Such a pivotal role would perfectly satisfy the ambitious 
DPRK that already claims a status of nuclear power.
However, in building regional security the potential of Russian influence 
on North Korea must not be exaggerated. In fact, Russia’s ability to project its 
economic power, especially through oil and gas pipelines, would be greatly 
enhanced if political tensions between the two Koreas declined and they 
finally moved to unification. Cooperation between Russia, North and South 
Korea in oil, gas and railway construction and exploitation projects can be 
a good start for reconciliation. No progress in Russian-DPRK relations is 
possible without close Russian-ROK cooperation.
The concept of three-party cooperation means the combination of Russian 
energy and resources, North Korean territory and labor, and South Korean 
capital and technology. The objectives of this policy – to revive and modernize 
the North Korean economy, to create income sources, and to promote inter-
Korean cooperation and economic ties of both Koreas with Russia – would 
lead to the creation of economically integrated system of Northeast Asia. 
Russian-Korean trilateral relations are based on a solid footing and replete 
with opportunities that can benefit each of them. 
In this light, Russian-Korean relations can be seen as based on a solid 
footing and replete with opportunities that can benefit each of them. The 
new administrations in the Kremlin and Seoul’s ‘Blue House’, together with 
the new generation of leaders in Pyongyang, can radically change the political 
climate in the region. A simple strengthening of economic and military 
relationships between the three countries will contribute to the peaceful 
solution of the ‘Korean nuclear problem’ and prepare the basis for durable 
peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. 
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